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SELENE KO* 
I should perhaps mention, as an introduction to this introduction, that I 
was not a participant in this Symposium. The editors of Global Studies 
invited me to write this piece in order to familiarize the reader with the 
circumstances in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) that surround the 
drafting of the Anti-Monopoly Law. Although the Draft Law is available 
publicly in other places, this Law Review was asked not to publish the 
draft. Regardless, the pieces that follow this introduction are a unique 
opportunity for scholars studying the PRC. These pieces provide a kind of 
legislative history for the Anti-Monopoly Law by showing how Chinese 
and foreign scholars have come together and shared their experiences in 
the area of competition law. 
In 1995, a drafting group was established to develop a Chinese Anti-
Monopoly Law. As the Chinese leadership pursued reform efforts to move 
toward a more market-oriented economy and win international support for 
China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), many 
recognized that the existing competition laws were still insufficient to 
 
 
 † This Essay is the work of the Author alone and in no way represents or expresses the views 
of the Congressional Executive Commission on China, its staff, or any of its members. The opinions 
expressed in this Essay are the personal views of the Author and do not necessarily reflect the views of 
the Congressional Executive Commission on china or any of its individual members.  
 * Selene S. Ko received an A.B. in East Asian Studies from Harvard College and a J.D. from 
Harvard Law School. She currently serves as Chief Counsel for Trade and Commercial Law for the 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, which was established as part of the U.S.-China 
Relations Act of 2000 to monitor and report on human rights and rule of law development in China. 
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address the challenges presented by the inflow of foreign companies into 
the marketplace and the expectations of foreign investors and China’s 
trading partners. The Anti-Monopoly Law is regarded as an important step 
in limiting the government’s involvement in the economy, as it is expected 
not only to regulate anti-competitive practices of private actors but also to 
prohibit “the abuse of administrative powers to restrict competition.”1 
While the substantive provisions of the Draft Law are important, the 
process by which this law and other laws are being developed is equally as 
significant, in terms of what such process reflect about the status of 
China’s compliance with its WTO obligations and the development of the 
rule-of-law in China.  
As part of its entry into the WTO, China committed to incorporating 
certain rule-of-law principles into its legal system, including, but not 
limited to those imposed on all WTO members. A number of WTO 
accession agreements impose transparency obligations on its members by 
requiring that all laws, regulations, judicial decisions, and administrative 
rulings relating to trade be published promptly.2 WTO agreements also 
require that trade-related measures be administered in a “uniform, 
impartial, and reasonable manner.”3 Moreover, trade-related measures 
should not be enforced before they are officially published.4 Finally, WTO 
members must maintain tribunals and procedures for the prompt, 
independent review of trade-related administrative actions.5  
China’s WTO accession documents elaborate on its rule-of-law related 
obligations and impose more specific directives as to how China must 
 
 
 1. Donald C. Clarke, China’s Draft Anti-Monopoly Law, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton, & 
Garrison Lawyer Memo (Oct. 2002), http://www.paulweiss.com/db30/cgi-bin/pubs/Anti-monopoly 
%20law.PDF. 
 2. See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]; see also WTO, WTO Legal Texts, at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 2003); General 
Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, WTO Agreement, Annex 1B, 33 
I.L.M. 1167 [hereinafter GATS]; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal 
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, art. 63, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]; 
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 1, 
33 I.L.M. 1125 [hereinafter TRIMs] (referencing obligations on transparency found in Article X of 
GATT 1994). 
 3. See, e.g., GATT, art. X(3)(a), GATS, art. VI(1). Similar language in TRIPS provides that 
“[p]rocedures concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights shall be fair and equitable. 
They shall not be unnecessarily complicated or costly, or entail unreasonable time-limits or 
unwarranted delays.” TRIPS, art. 41.  
 4. GATT, art. X(2). 
 5. GATT, art. X(3)(b). See also TRIMs, art. 6(1).  
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implement certain obligations, such as its transparency obligations. 
According to China’s Protocol on Accession (the “Protocol”):  
China shall establish or designate an official journal dedicated to the 
publication of all laws, regulations and other measures pertaining to 
or affecting trade in goods, services, TRIPS or the control of foreign 
exchange and, after publication of its laws, regulations or other 
measures in such journal, shall provide a reasonable period for 
comment to the appropriate authorities before such measures are 
implemented . . . . China shall publish this journal on a regular basis 
and make copies of all issues of this journal readily available to 
individuals and enterprises.6  
Other provisions of the Protocol contain similar publication 
requirements with respect to procedures governing State trading, import 
and export licensing, establishing technical regulations and standards, 
price setting, and judicial review.7 As previously mentioned, some of the 
obligations found in China’s accession documents go beyond those 
imposed on other countries during their accession processes. This 
difference results from the fact that, unlike other WTO applicants, China 
was not required to achieve full compliance prior to accession. One term 
of access unique to China, which trade analysts often highlight, mandates 
that China provide a reasonable period for comment on a trade-related 
measure before it is enforced. This practice is commonly known as 
providing “notice and comment.”  
The significance of the transparency obligations is that they require 
China to open its traditionally opaque legislative and regulatory processes 
to the public and prohibit such practices as enforcement of neibu (internal) 
policies that cannot be accessed by the public (either before going into 
effect or once they become enforceable). While implementation of China’s 
transparency obligations is necessary to satisfy the expectations of its 
trading partners, China’s new-found interest in moving toward more open, 
transparent lawmaking and administrative rulemaking procedures reaches 
beyond a mere desire to comply with the terms of its WTO membership. 
As awareness of individual freedoms and rights has grown, so has the 
 
 
 6. WTO, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China to the World Trade 
Organization, WT/L/432, Nov. 10, 2001, art. 2(c)(2), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/ 
DDFDocuments/t/WT/L/432.doc (last visited Dec. 19, 2003). 
 7. See generally id.; WTO, Working Party Report on the Accession of China, 
WT/ACC/CHN/49 Oct. 21, 2001, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/ACC/ 
CHN49.doc (last visited Dec. 19, 2003). 
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demand by the public for higher quality laws and for the right to 
participate in making those laws. China’s lawmakers are increasingly 
recognizing that improved transparency is a potent means of gaining 
legitimacy for legislation.8  
I. REFORM OF LAWMAKING AND RULEMAKING PROCESSES 
The PRC Legislation Law passed in 2000 states that the standing 
committee of National People’s Congress (NPC) shall seek opinions from 
various parties for legislative bills placed on the agenda for a particular 
session.9 According to Article 35 of the Legislation Law, where the 
legislative bills are “important,” draft laws may be published in order to 
solicit opinions.10 In 2001, the Standing Committee of the NPC published 
a draft Marriage Law for public comment pursuant to Article 35. Chinese 
news outlets reported enthusiastic responses from the public. However, 
there is little evidence that the hearing on the Marriage Law has created 
any real momentum for expanding the use of public hearings in general.11 
The Legislation Law does not require the NPC to publish any draft laws, 
and without any such provisions mandating publication there is no 
guarantee that all trade-related laws will be published for comment as 
required by the terms of China’s WTO accession.  
With respect to the development of regulations, the State Council’s 
Procedural Rules for Formulating Administrative Regulations require that 
the State Council gather opinions from relevant government bodies, 
associations, and citizens, but, as is the case with the NPC, the Rules do 
not require administrative bodies to release draft regulations to the public 
at large.12 There are no uniform rules on how notice and comment are to 
be provided if an administrative body chooses to do so. Some central 
 
 
 8. Notes of Congressional-Executive Commission on China staff delegation trip to China (text 
on file with author). 
 9. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo lifa fa [The Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of 
China], art. 34, in Quanguo renmin daibiao dahui changwu weiyuanhui gongbao [Gazette of the 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress] No. 2, 112 (2000). 
 10. Id. art. 35.  
 11. In 2002 the Ministry of Railways received a great deal of attention from the press for holding 
a “landmark public hearing” on rate increases for railway ticket prices that was intended to serve as a 
model for other hearings. While the hope was that provincial level offices would use the hearing as a 
model there is no indication that that other ministries are following the lead of the Ministry of 
Railways. Landmark Hearing Set in Beijing on Rail Ticket Prices, CHINA DAILY, Jan. 7, 2002, 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/2002/Jan/24848.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2003).  
 12. Xingzheng fagui zhiding chengxu tiaoli [Procedural rules for Formulating Administrative 
Regulations], arts. 12, 19, 20, 22, (2002), http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=16619 (last 
visited Dec. 19, 2003).  
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government bodies make selected draft laws and regulations available to 
the public through publication in gazettes and on websites. Some 
ministries and commissions share measures in draft form with limited 
audiences, which raises concerns about discrimination and selective 
transparency. Oftentimes, interested parties have the opportunity to speak 
with government officials about the subject matter of proposed legislation, 
but have no access to the actual text. Even when governmental authorities 
make draft documents public, critics argue that doing so is meaningless 
because the circulated draft is already being treated as the final version. 
Much of the effort to improve transparency has occurred not at the 
national level, but within the local people’s congresses (LPCs) and local 
administrative bodies, which reflects the Chinese government’s preference 
for testing legal reforms through pilot programs at the local level before 
implementing them nationally. For example, the Shanghai People’s 
Congress has pioneered the opening of the legislative process. In addition 
to holding a number of public hearings on topics ranging from consumer 
protection to labor contracts to the preservation of historical buildings,13 
the congress has also institutionalized the practice of seeking the views of 
the Shanghai Bar Association when issuing new laws.14 Chinese lawyers 
report that the Shanghai People’s Congress is considering providing 
financial support to academics to draft legislation.15 Similarly, in the past 
year other provincial and municipal LPCs have also endeavored to 
increase public participation in their legislative processes, including the 
LPC’s in Yunnan, Sichuan, Zhejiang, Henan, Gansu, Beijing, Guangdong, 
Kunming, and Guiyang.16 However, these efforts to improve transparency 
are limited to only a small number of geographic areas.  
 
 
 13. Notes of Congressional-Executive Commission on China Staff Delegation Trip to China (text 
on file with author).  
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Yunnan Provincial People’s Congress Standing Committee passed a “Decision to Openly 
Solicit Legislative Items and Draft Laws.” This decision to call upon the public to submit legislative 
items and draft laws was the first attempt by Yunnan authorities to open the legislative process to 
public participation. Zhang Tingting, The Public Solicited for Legislative Items and Drafts, CHINA 
INTERNET INFORMATION NETWORK, Aug. 12, 2002, www.china.org.cn/english/2002/Aug/39228.htm 
(last visited Sept. 24, 2003). The Sichuan People’s Congress has been publicly soliciting proposals for 
local legislation since November 2002, and it included nine of these suggestions in the Standing 
Committee’s 2003 Plan on Legislation Proposals. Alex Xu, Nine Proposals by Public Representatives 
Adopted in Sichuan, CHINA INTERNET INFORMATION NETWORK, Jan. 3, 2002, www.china.org.cn/ 
english/2003/Jan/52699.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2003). The Standing Committee of Zhejiang 
Province has announced a plan to regularize public participation in its legislative process by opening 
all of its meetings to the public. Zhejiang: Citizens Have the Right to Attend Provincial People’s 
Congress Meetings, [ZHEJIANG RIBAO] ZHEJIANG DAILY, June 28, 2003, http://www.zjdaily.com.cn 
(last visited Aug. 14, 2003). The Henan Province. People’s Congress announced a similar opening of 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Still, the lawmaking and rulemaking processes at the national level 
have been opening gradually—albeit more slowly than at the local level. 
Starting in the late 1970s and early 1980s, long before the Legislation Law 
was passed, the NPC began turning to outside experts for assistance with 
developing important legislation,17 such as the 1982 Constitution, the 1997 
amendments to the Criminal Law, the 1989 Administrative Litigation 
Law, and the 1987 Civil Procedure Law.18 Notably, the circle of legal 
experts contributing to draft laws has become increasingly international as 
China has looked to models in market-based economies. For example, 
after a committee of Chinese academics developed the first draft of 
China’s Unified Contract Law, the second draft incorporated the views of 
foreign experts.19 In addition to improving the substance of the law, the 
process itself profited from the participation of academics. Chinese law 
scholar Pitman Potter notes: 
To a considerable extent, the fact that the drafting process was 
given over largely to a cadre of legal specialists meant that many 
bureaucratic concerns of specific government agencies were left 
aside. While a number of conflicting views were forcefully 
articulated in the course of debates among the specialists on the 
drafting committees, the participants seemed to have avoided most 
of the bureaucratic politics that has been associated with NPC 
activities in connection with other legislation such as bankruptcy 
law.20 
The trend of involving academics, including foreign academics, has 
only expanded since China joined the WTO. Within the NPC’s Working 
Committee on Legal Affairs, the legislative body established a WTO 
group, which has provided funding for academics to develop legislative 
drafts.21 With advice from Chinese and foreign scholars, NPC drafters are 
 
 
its deliberations in September 2003. PRC: Henan To Allow Citizens, Foreigners To Observe 
Provincial Congress Meetings, ZHENGZHOU HENAN RIBAO, Sept. 24, 2003, as translated in FBIS, 
Doc. ID CPP20030925000007. In December 2002, the Guiyang City People’s Congress began 
soliciting legislative proposals as well as comments from the public on existing legislation. Citizens 
Invited to Participate in Lawmaking in SW China Province, XINHUA, Dec. 25, 2002, 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/government/52072.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2003).  
 17. See Zhu Jingwen, Public Participation in Law-Making in the PRC, in LAW-MAKING IN THE 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 141 (2000).  
 18. Id. at n.2.  
 19. Pitman Potter, Law-Making in the People’s Republic of China: the Case of Contracts, in 
LAW-MAKING IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 199 (2000).  
 20. Id. at 200. 
 21. Notes of Congressional-Executive Commission on China Staff Delegation Trip to China, 
Shanghai, Nov. 6, 2002 (text on file with author). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss2/2
p267 Ko introduction book pages.doc  2/2/2004  
 
 
 
 
 
2004] AN INTRODUCTION TO CHINESE LEGISLATION 273 
 
 
 
 
working on major laws such as the Anti-Monopoly Law, the 
Administrative Procedure law and a new Civil Code that are expected to 
broadly impact Chinese society.  
Additionally, non-academic legal experts are starting to contribute 
significantly to the drafting process. While Chinese lawmakers have often 
cooperated with foreign government counterparts on legal reform, only 
recently have private sector actors become more active. In the last few 
years, bar associations, including the All-China Lawyers Association, the 
Beijing Bar Association, and the Shanghai Bar Association, have helped 
draft trade-related measures and provided suggestions for changes to 
existing legislation that is not WTO compliant. Moreover, in many cases 
where government bodies do not publish drafts, officials have attempted to 
at least solicit views from parties interested in the legislation, such as 
representatives of regulated industries, even when the draft is treated as 
“confidential.”  
II. ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW 
The development of the new Anti-Monopoly Law reflects this trend 
towards increasing the participation of outside experts, both Chinese and 
foreign, in the drafting of laws. While originally the drafting committee 
consisted of bureaucrats,22 the development of law is now being driven by 
Wang Xiaoye, a researcher at the Law Institute of the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences and Vice President of the Chinese Economic Law 
Research Society. In 2002, Professor Wang joined other Chinese scholars 
working on the draft of the Anti-monopoly Law at the Chinese Anti-
Monopoly Law Symposium in Beijing. This compendium consists of the 
contributions to the Beijing symposium by scholars from China, Japan, the 
United States, Germany, Indonesia, Venezuela, Thailand, and South Korea 
on their country’s respective experiences drafting, executing, and 
amending anti-monopoly laws. 
The free exchange of ideas among experts from both China and around 
the world on approaches to competition law, as well as the fact that China 
hosted this exchange reflects the intent of Chinese authorities to consider 
foreign models in the formulation of competition policy.23 It also 
 
 
 22. The drafting group members mainly come from the Laws and Regulations Department of the 
State Economic and Trade Commission and the Laws and Regulations Department of the State 
Administration of Industry and Commerce.  
 23. Minister of the State Administration of Industry and Commerce (SAIC), Competition Policy 
Statement, http://www.apeccp.org.tw/doc/China/Policy/cnpol1.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2003). 
“SAIC shall strengthen multilateral and bilateral communication and cooperation with competition 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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demonstrates the increased freedom China gives academics working on 
new legislation, especially within the realm of economic law. For 
example, Professor Wang has been permitted to speak to the media about 
the draft law. In an interview in August 2003, she explained to the Shiji 
Jingji Baodao her views on the history of the development of the Anti-
Monopoly Law, its strengths and shortcomings, and what she believed to 
be the obstacles to its implementation.24  
III. CONCLUSION 
Despite these generally positive trends in opening lawmaking and 
rulemaking, substantial challenges still threaten China’s ability to achieve 
the level of transparency contemplated by China’s WTO Protocol and 
expected by China’s trading partners—and, increasingly, by Chinese 
citizens. For example, the legislative process continues to remain closed to 
real, meaningful input from the citizenry. Moreover, while representing 
the progress China has made, the development of the Chinese Anti-
Monopoly Law also demonstrates the limitations that still exist. The 
debate at the Beijing Symposium was open and free among academics, 
however, the Chinese government still considers the draft text of the Anti-
Monopoly Law itself to be confidential and has not made it available to 
the public. Furthermore, even though reports indicate the drafting group 
completed a basic draft in early 2002, no public hearings have been held.  
Nevertheless, even if China had rules and procedures that were capable 
of ensuring that legislation as significant as the Anti-Monopoly Law was 
being issued in a manner compliant with its WTO transparency 
commitments, other obstacles still may prevent China from meeting its full 
complement of rule-of-law obligations. While academic expertise may 
improve the quality of the law itself, even the best drafting cannot 
overcome the barriers to implementation inherent in the Chinese legal 
system. First, the Anti-Monopoly Law will affect the power of certain 
industries and government organizations, which have a special interest in 
maintaining pre-existing monopolies. As a result, not only has the 
introduction of the legislation25 been delayed, but implementation could be 
adversely affected following passage of the law. Second, at a more basic 
level, even the most open and transparent process cannot ensure the 
 
 
authorities in other economies in the process of legislation and enforcement of competition law.” Id.  
 24. CASS Expert Predicts WTO Meeting to Spur Enactment of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, 
SHIJI JINGJI BAODAO, Sept. 1, 2003, translated in FBIS, Doc. ID No. CPP20030905000216. 
 25. Id. 
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creation of a more democratic system of governance. Because 
representatives are only elected to the lowest levels of people’s 
congresses, there is no guarantee that representatives in the legislative 
bodies will ever consider the citizenry’s views.26 Still, efforts to broaden 
the sources of input to the drafting process are helping China progress 
towards a system based on the rule of law and should be encouraged.  
 
 
 26. China has experimented with direct elections at and below the county level. However, even 
at these levels, critics argue the process is not necessarily democratic. See CONGRESSIONAL-
EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA, 2002 ANNUAL REPORT 35, available at http://www.cecc.gov/ 
pages/annualRpt/2002annRptEng.pdf (last visited Dec. 19, 2003). 
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